SANDY D. JAP* may not be entirely clear.l Do the classic allocation rules still hold under these conditions? Does the use of these rules have any effect on critical relational outcomes? To date, no one has tried to test or generalize the results to more complex settings in which such assumptions about the pie may not exist. Research on allocating outcomes among multiple participants in the economics and psychology literature focuses on the size of the pie shares or the cognitive processes for evaluating pie shares, but neither literature addresses the process for how the pie is shared.
In complex collaboration contexts such as research and development (R&D), organizations may be involved in an array of activities ranging from exploring science and technology advancements to directing programs of activities that develop practical competencies to developing applied projects aimed at specific tasks (Hauser 1998 ). These collaborations are often formed in risky, uncertain settings around nonstandard business objectives (i.e., to learn a technology or "keep a window" on an opportunity). Specification of all the expected outcomes or the magnitude of these outcomes before the collaboration may be difficult, and tying each organization's tasks and resources to its outcomes is also arduous, as these collaborations often involve the use of several intangibles (e.g., expertise, tacit understandings, joint knowledge), which are difficult to evaluate. Moreover, the organizations may not share a common pie-each organization may receive very different benefits. How is sharing accomplished in such complex settings?
Does the sharing process have an impact on key relational outcomes, such as satisfaction with the collaboration, perceived fairness of the outcomes, and willingness to collaborate in the future? As more and more industries experience consolidation, the number of potential collaboration partners is also diminishing. This places a growing importance on repeated collaborations with a few organizations. If the collaboration participants are not satisfied with their outcomes or do not believe that they are receiving a fair share of the expanded pie, future collaborations are undermined and less likely to occur; it also becomes increasingly difficult to build mutually beneficial relationships between these organizations. Therefore, knowing how to share an expanded pie effectively between organizations in complex collaboration contexts such as R&D has important implications for long-term relationship management and interorganizational coordination. Effective management of R&D also carries implications for the successful development of new products.
The focus of this research is on understanding the relational impact of pie sharing in complex collaboration settings and the conditions under which these consequences occur. In this article, I describe one potential explanation of the pie-sharing process, based on a review of relevant research in economics, psychology, and marketing, as well as depth interviews with R&D managers, scientists, and engineers. The theoretical literature illuminates the motivational concerns and sharing principles that are operative in the process, whereas the field interviews identify the specific resource and organizational characteristics that constitute the collaboration context. I propose that the strategic lEach of these conditions introduces mathematical complexities that make it difficult or impossible to determine an equilibrium condition. use of sharing principles in conjunction with various resource and organizational factors enhances relational outcomes. I empirically test this possibility through a survey of 300 R&D managers, scientists, and engineers. The article concludes with a discussion of results, limitations, and directions for further research. By discovering the sharing approaches that are used in practice and observing the conditions in which the principles are used, I seek to stimulate additional thinking and investigations into this important aspect of collaboration management.
SHARING IN COMPLEX CONTEXTS
In this section, a conceptual framework of the pie-sharing process in complex collaboration contexts is developed. Collaboration refers to a close, functionally interdependent relationship in which organizations strive to create mutually beneficial outcomes for all participants. The unit of analysis is the perspective of an organizational participant in a collaboration composed of two financially independent, noncompetitive organizations, in which each supplies a complementary competency that enables the joint effort.2 Therefore, joint ventures, networks, horizontal relationships, and vertically integrated relationships are beyond the scope of this study. Although the organizations may differ in the functions they perform, symmetry is expected in the nature and pattern of causation of the behavioral constructs that underlie their relationship.
The term complex is used to refer to the difficulty of assessing and comparing each party's contributions, gains, and competencies in the collaboration process. An R&D setting is used as the backdrop for this investigation, because collaborations within this realm typically possess such characteristics. Often, the parties "don't know what they don't know;" in other words, they may have no realization of how much surplus there is to be shared or what type of serendipitous circumstance or outcome may occur over the course of the collaboration. Collaborations of R&D can occur among individual boundary spanners (e.g., principal investigators) and their counterparts in other firms, universities, and national laboratories and play a critical role in creating new knowledge through specialized innovation.
In many organizations, the R&D function lays an important foundation in the development of new products. According to a recent National Science Foundation survey, from 1995 to 1997, U.S. companies invested heavily in R&D ($206 billion); in fact, the rate of R&D expenditures outpaced the national economy as a whole. To improve the efficiency of this magnitude of investments, organizations must learn to manage the process and the outcomes received effectively. A growing concern among many R&D units is that their principle investigators, research laboratories, or other organizational units may not be managing this potentially strategic process optimally.
Relationship Quality
A central concern in this study is the impact of sharing principles on the relationship between organizations. Much of the prior research on sharing outcomes among multiple participants examines each party's maximization of its indi-2These collaborations are not merely procurement exchanges but involve the joint development of outcomes. vidual outcomes (for a review, see Roth 1995) . There is also a research stream that considers appropriate metrics for R&D project success (for an annotated bibliography, see Hauser 1996) . Although these aspects are important to consider, research on sharing should also consider how the use of these principles affects the relationship between the participants, because enhancement of the relationship may have a significantly greater impact on their joint utility.
How the sharing process affects the relationship also carries long-term ramifications. In many industries, organizations need to work with each other on a repeated basis. If organizations act opportunistically in the short run, they may develop a negative reputation that will inhibit other organizations from working with them in the future. Therefore, it is important that organizations in collaborations learn to develop a sharing process that fosters satisfaction with the collaboration, a sense of fairness in the outcomes, and a willingness to collaborate again in the future. The value of these benefits is reflected in an attitudinal variable, relationship quality. The essence of relationship quality is a belief in the integrity and reliability of the other party (Crosby, Evans, and Cowles 1990; Dwyer and Oh 1988; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995) . These beliefs are reflected in (1) an organization's evaluations of the present relationship (i.e., satisfaction with the collaboration and outcome fairness) and (2) future expectations of the relationship (i.e., willingness to collaborate in the future). Although there is no consensus on the definition of relationship quality, researchers have identified several distinct, though related, constructs. Dwyer and Oh (1988) first defined it in terms of satisfaction, minimal opportunism, and trust. Crosby, Evans, and Cowles (1990) underscore trust and satisfaction as critical components. Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995) add conflict, commitment, willingness to invest, and expectations of continuity to the notion of trust but do not include satisfaction.
I conceptualize relationship quality as a higher-order concept involving satisfaction, outcome fairness, and willingness to collaborate in the future. These three elements are useful in reducing uncertainty, because they provide insight into the motivations and performance of the other party and project the value and persistence of these factors into the future. Relationship quality in R&D collaborations operates in a manner similar to interaction quality in informationsharing relationships (Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpande 1992); both are useful in reducing uncertainty in the interorganizational context. Conflict is not included in this conceptualization because it can be either functional or dysfunctional to the relationship (Deutsch 1969) .
Evaluation of the present relationship. Satisfaction and outcome fairness are attitudinal constructs that capture the evaluation of the current relationship. Satisfaction with the collaboration is a positive affective state resulting from the appraisal of all aspects of a working relationship. In the literature on channel relationship management, it is one of the most studied outcome variables (for a review, see Gaski 1984; Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1999) and an important indicator of the impact of the collaboration process on the relationship. Outcome fairness is the organization's perception that it has received a fair share of the divided pie of outcomes, benefits, and gains from the collaboration. Together, these constructs provide insight into the perceived reliability and integrity of the other party. Satisfaction with the relationship reduces uncertainty regarding the degree to which the relationship exceeds expectations, and fair outcomes indicate that the other party is not solely concerned with its own position. Future expectations. Another aspect of relationship quality is willingness to collaborate in the future. This indicates the degree to which an organization would be willing to engage in mutual endeavors again, should the opportunity arise. Heide and Miner (1992) highlight the close relationship between expectations of future interaction ("the shadow of the future") and cooperative behavior. Anderson and Weitz (1989) underscore the importance of future expectations in determining the continuity of exchange in channel dyads. Similarly, the literature on social exchange points to the role of future expectations in determining the long-term survival of the relationship. If the parties do not perceive that they will receive worthwhile benefits from the relationship in the future, they are likely to exit.
Fairness and Sharing
Research in economics and psychology examines outcome allocation among individuals. Allocation of outcomes among organizations may differ in important ways, which I consider in building the conceptual framework. The economics and psychology literature indicate that relational concerns and norms of fairness often motivate allocations among participants. The classic demonstration of this is in research using ultimatum and dictator games. In the ultimatum game, one player (the proposer) offers to another player (the responder) some portion of the money to be allocated. The responder can accept the offer or reject it, in which case both parties receive nothing. Although economic theory would predict that the offer should be a penny (or the smallest unit of currency available) and the responder should accept, the average offer is approximately 30%o-40%, and 50/50 splits are often the mode. Offers of less than 20% are typically rejected. This is a robust phenomenon that does not change as the stakes are increased (Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith 1996) 
or across various nationalities of the individual participants (Roth et al. 1991).
Many economists attribute this result to relational concerns and norms of fairness; proposers offer more because they know that the responder can reject an offer that is unfair. Rabin (1993) describes a fairness equilibrium in which players differentiate between an intentional act of meanness, which they will punish, and an inadvertently mean act, which they will tolerate. Consistent with this, Blount (1995) finds that responders are more likely to accept small offers if they come from a random device than if they are chosen by the proposer. Therefore, it appears that people will not reject inequality but will punish unfairness.
This has led Camerer and Thaler (1995) to propose what they call the "economics of manners" to explain the negative relationship between a responder's own utility and the other player's payoffs when the responder rejects small offers. Camerer and Thaler argue that players do not care about the other's welfare per se but desire some kind of equity in the context of the interaction. Research on dictator games (i.e., the responder has no choice about accepting the offer) indicates that people are willing to share a pie with a stranger, but not if the players believe they have earned the right to the pie or that the relationship is impersonal (Hoffman et al. 1994a, b) . Polite business practice, or norms of fairness (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986), may require a person to share gains with a friend but does not require sharing with a stranger. Therefore, manners, or fairness, guide how outcomes are shared between people. Such norms are learned rules that are difficult to repress even in one-shot encounters (Hoffman et al. 1994b; Murnighan and Saxon 1994) . Why do people leave tips in restaurants they never expect to visit again? Because it would be rude to do otherwise. This is not to say that self-interested behavior has no role in outcome allocation decisions. As information asymmetries are introduced, proposers continue to appear fair but capitalize on the responder's lack of information (Kagel, Kim, and Moser 1996) . When competition is introduced between the players, the proposer's offer moves closer to zero (Roth et al. 1991; Schotter, Weiss, and Zapater 1994) .
Sharing Principles
In R&D collaborations, the assurance of fairness in allocating outcomes is particularly critical because there may be a great deal of uncertainty in the nature of the pie, its potential size, and the probability of successful pie expansion. By demonstrating an attempt to uphold fairness concerns in the sharing process, participants gain some assurances against this uncertainty. They realize that regardless of what happens, there will be an attempt to ensure fair outcomes for both parties. One way this may occur is by the application of sharing principles in the collaboration process. Although it might be expected that the principles for sharing in R&D collaborations would be more complicated than the principles used in less complex contexts, my field interviews indicated that participants relied on some simple principles for sharing. This may be because such principles are relatively intuitive, easy to implement, and often less costly than trying to resolve an indeterminate situation (Schelling 1960) . Often, simple rules can be relatively robust to varying information constraints and uncertainties and tend to leave the participants in improved positions.
The two sharing principles most commonly discussed by my informants are equity and equality. An equity rule specifies that each member's payoffs are a function of its resources-tangible and intangible contributions, costs incurred, and so forth-to the collaboration. The greater the party's contribution to the collaboration, the greater is its payoff. Equity principles for sharing are derived from equity theory (Adams 1965; Walster, Walster, and Berscheid 1978), which states that people judge an outcome as fair when the ratio of their own resources and output equals the ratio of resources and output of comparison others. The literature in group decision making indicates that equity principles are generally used when productivity is the primary goal (Deutsch 1985; Kabanoff 1991) and is typically advocated by those with high resources (McGrath 1984). In field interviews with R&D participants, many informants told me that an equity principle would be used to account for resources to the task such as financial contributions, technical expertise, and asset ownership. The organization that contributed the bulk of the expertise or equipment would receive a larger proportion of the benefits gained.
The equality rule specifies that each party receives an equal share of the payoffs-a 50/50 split, in this research.
This rule typically is used in groups when the priority is to maintain within-group harmony, social relationships, and dissension reduction (Deutsch 1985; Kabanoff 1991) and is advocated by those with low resources (McGrath 1984). Research on this rule indicates that though it may not foster the highest levels of productivity, it facilitates close cooperation among members; it is particularly useful when differences between various resources are vague and hard to measure (Allison, McQueen, and Schaerfl 1992; Allison and Messick 1990).
My interviews with key informants indicated that participants relied on one or a combination of the rules to apply to various resource and organizational conditions in the collaboration. Although these principles are not exhaustive of the universe of possibilities, I focus on them in this research as an incremental first step toward understanding the use of sharing principles in complex collaborations. By focusing on the use of simple rules, I do not mean to imply that complex sharing rules are not used in R&D collaborations; a few informants did use such principles. However, when these complex rules were examined more closely, it was clear that they were merely combinations of the basic equity and equality principles. For example, the parties may begin a collaboration by using an equity rule until each organization has received its respective return from its investment. Over time, each organization's processes, roles, and investments may become increasingly interdependent, and the organizations may switch to an equality rule. In other cases, organizations may use an equity rule to apply to one aspect of a project and an equality rule to apply to other parts. In summary, I found that despite the complexity of the collaboration context, the participants often relied on these relatively simple heuristics to guide their sharing process or aspects of it.
In the next section, I hypothesize that the use of these sharing principles in conjunction with specific resource and organizational conditions can aid in improving relationship quality between the parties, because these rules uphold fairness concerns between the parties.
THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL
An overview of the conceptual model is displayed in Figure 1 . My primary goal is to understand how the sharing process affects relational outcomes between the parties. Therefore, I examine factors such as satisfaction with the collaboration, outcome fairness, and willingness to collaborate in the future. Research in economics and psychology suggests that participants are motivated by fairness concerns and the risks of external contracting. As a result, I hypothesize that they will (1) evaluate the contributions, or resources, of each organization and (2) consider organizational information that reduces moral hazard and adverse selection risks. The field interviews highlight some generalized characteristics of the resources (i.e., asymmetric, separable, and idiosyncratic) and organizations (i.e., the ability to observe the other party's actions, understanding of the transformation process, and equal payoff valuations) in complex collaboration contexts that address these concerns. I propose that organizations apply a sharing rule to these resource and organizational conditions in such a way as to have a positive impact on overall relationship quality. Indicates a moderating effect of sharing principles on outcomes.
I now consider the resource and organizational conditions that are brought to R&D collaborations as well as the moral hazard and adverse selection risks associated with such close relationships. Then I describe how the application of sharing principles to these specific conditions can positively affect relationship quality.
Resource Conditions
In psychology, research on equity theory indicates that people judge an outcome as fair when the ratio of their own resources and output equals the ratio of resources and output of comparison others (Adams 1965; Walster, Walster, and Berscheid 1978) . Research on joint authorship collaboration indicates that people attempt to value the size of each participant's contributions and efforts when determining credit as a coauthor (Floyd, Schroeder, and Finn 1994; Spiegel and Keith-Spiegel 1970) . The Academy of Management recently endorsed the sharing of credit "in correct proportion to the various parties' contributions" (Academy of Management Journal 1990, p. 903). In R&D collaborations, my field interviews indicated that organizations also consider each party's contributions in determining its fair share of the pie. Each participant may contribute resources such as intellectual property, human resources, equipment, funding, and specific expertise. The nature of these resources may be asymmetric or easily separable between the organizations, or they may be idiosyncratic to the joint relationship.3 Each organization is motivated to ensure that it receives a fair return on its investments. There is also some concern that the other party receives a fair share (Guth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze 1982; Schmitt and Marwell 1972). Neither party wants the other party to receive less than a fair share, but neither wants the other to receive a disproportionately greater share of the outcomes (Pruitt and Rubin 1986). These concerns can be managed through the application of a sharing rule that best accounts for each organization's contributions and ensures a fair share of the expanded pie.
Organizations will judge the impact and appropriateness of a sharing principle differently, depending on the characteristics of the resources to the collaboration. If one organization makes asymmetric contributions to the relationshipcontributes more resources than the other party-it is vulnerable to opportunistic behavior from the partner. Consistent with this, Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer (1995) find that firms making smaller investments than their part-3The resources may also possess all three of these characteristics simultaneously. In this research, I consider each of these characteristics individually and encourage future researchers to consider further the interactions among all three factors. ners tend to act opportunistically within the relationship. Therefore, the organization that contributes more resources than the partner will be motivated to use an equity rule to ensure a larger portion of the expanded pie for itself. By using an equity rule, the organization can manage the potential vulnerability that results from asymmetric resources, because this rule ensures that the one that has made the greater contribution will receive the dominant share of the output. Therefore, the use of this rule should have a positive effect on relationship quality when an organization's resources are asymmetric with its partner's. Sometimes, the parties create idiosyncratic investments (e.g., software, specific expertise and skill sets) that are dedicated to the specific collaboration. These investments are nonfungible, or nontransferable, to alternative collaboration arrangements and lose value if the relationship is prematurely terminated (Williamson 1985) . Because the. investments are created to support the joint relationship, the use of an equality principle should have a positive impact on relationship quality. An equity sharing rule might promote relationship maintenance by giving the parties an incentive to remain in the relationship until the value of the investments is recovered. However, an equity rule may be more difficult to apply than an equality rule, particularly if each party's role is vague or hard to measure. H3: When resources are idiosyncratic to the relationship, the use of an equality sharing principle has a positive effect on relationship quality.
Organizational Conditions
In many collaborations, organizations pair with other organizations that have complementary competencies or processes that enable the dyad to achieve goals and outcomes beyond each organization's individual reach (Weitz and Jap 1995) . Although effective for joint success, this approach to external contracting activities creates moral hazard and adverse selection risks. Moral hazard is a form of postcontractual opportunism that arises when actions required or desired under the contract are not freely observable (Grossman and Hart 1983; Milgrom and Roberts 1992) . This can be remedied by structuring the transaction in such a way that the other firm will take actions that are in the best interest of both parties. In R&D collaborations, this may be accomplished through the ability to observe the other party and an understanding of the other party's transformation process. Both of these factors reduce moral hazard risks. The more an organization is able to observe the other party's actions, the easier it is to monitor the other's effort and manage the moral hazard risks in the collaboration (see Radner 1985) . As an organization is able to observe the actions of its counterpart over time, it is better able to assess whether its actions are in the best interests of the collaborative effort. This may be because there are more opportunities to spread the risk over multiple time periods (Fudenberg, Holmstrom, and Milgrom 1990) . Using an equity rule when an organization has the ability to observe the other party's processes and actions helps ensure that the counterpart's outcomes are in accordance with its efforts over time. Therefore, the ability to observe the other party's actions and the allocation of outcomes in accordance with this action gives the counterpart an incentive to act in a way that is supportive of the collaborative effort. This should have a positive impact on satisfaction with the collaboration, perceptions of fairness in the outcomes, and willingness to collaborate in the future.
H4: When an organization has the ability to observe the other party, the use of an equity sharing principle has a positive effect on relationship quality.
An ability to understand the other party's transformation process-how the party converts resources to outputsenables an organization to map a reasonable expectation of the payoff to the collaboration ex ante. This increases an organization's ability to evaluate the degree to which the other firm is acting in accordance with the best interests of the joint effort. The use of an equity-sharing approach when an organization understands the counterpart's activities provides an assurance that the counterpart's behaviors will be fairly rewarded according to the value of its transformation process. This should have a positive impact on relationship quality. H5: When an organization understands the other party's transformation process, the use of an equity-sharing principle has a positive effect on relationship quality.
Adverse selection is a form of precontractual opportunism that arises when the other party in an exchange has private information about something that affects the organization's net benefit from the exchange (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). One solution to this problem of information asymmetry is for the other party to signal its intention to the other organization. This may be done by revealing its valuation of the expected payoff from the collaboration. Each organization enters into a collaboration with the hope of achieving some type of desired end-patents, reduced time to market, control over future technologies, potential commercial applications, and so forth. By signaling its valuation of its expected payoff from the collaboration, the other firm gives the organization information about its intentions and likely effort.
When an organization knows that its counterpart has equal payoff valuations-both organizations value these benefits similarly, and they place an equal value on the expected outcomes of the collaboration (e.g., they both want to produce joint patents or jointly control future technologies)-the organization gains an assurance that the counterpart will behave in a manner that is beneficial to the joint effort. If the counterpart behaves differently, it will adversely affect its own position as well as the joint position. If both organizations value the outcomes of the collaboration similarly, an equality sharing rule should have a positive impact on relationship quality. The use of such a rule gives both parties an incentive to cooperate closely to achieve desired ends and promotes social harmony in the process (McGrath 1984) . It also represents an assurance that each participant will receive a fair share of the expanded pie.
H6: When the organizations value the payoffs similarly, the use of an equality sharing principle has a positive effect on relationship quality.
These six hypotheses are developed on the basis of the theoretical literature and the environmental context as described by key organizational informants. However, in practice, it is possible that the alternative rule also works well or even better because of some systematic aspects of the environment or collaboration. It might also be that the alternative rule has a negative impact on the relationship and should be avoided. In other words, these sharing rules may have additional effects in practice that have not yet been discovered or considered in the literature. I examine this possibility explicitly in the analysis.
METHOD

Questionnaire Development
Because of the lack of research on sharing among multiple participants in complex settings, 31 depth interviews were conducted with various R&D participants (managers, scientists, and engineers) in the telecommunications, automotive, chemical, and petroleum industries. The purpose of these interviews was to enhance my understanding of the sharing process in complex collaboration contexts and the principles that are used to share the pie. Informants described their perceptions of how the outcomes of R&D collaborations are shared in a variety of shortand long-term collaborations, along with their organizations' a priori goals, expectations, resources, and outcomes achieved.
A survey instrument was created on the basis of the depth interviews. This instrument incorporated the language of the informants, drawing on their experience to elicit responses that accurately reflected the organization's viewpoint (Campbell 1955). All the constructs were measured with multiple item, seven-point Likert-type scales, according to the recommendations of Nunnally (1978). The idiosyncratic resource scale was based on Anderson and Weitz's (1992).
All other scales were designed specifically for this research; at the time of the questionnaire design process, I was not aware of any known scales that measured these constructs of interest. Pretests with a select group of respondents from various types of organizations and backgrounds were iterated throughout the development of the questionnaire; the results of each round of pretests were incorporated into a revised questionnaire and pretested on a new group of R&D participants. A list of the items and scale reliabilities is listed in the Appendix. The anchors for all items were 1 = "strongly disagree" to 7 = "strongly agree." Table 1 exhibits the means, standard deviations (SDs), and correlations among the constructs.
Data Collection
Characteristics of the sample. I solicited questionnaire participation from the R&D departments of five organizations in the United States: (1) a federal research laboratory (the same one that participated in the field interviews); (2) a military and commercial jet aircraft manufacturer (annual sales of $52 billion); (3) a manufacturer of aerospace products: commercial aircraft, defense systems, and space systems (annual sales of $45 billion); (4) a tire manufacturer (annual sales of $14 billion); and (5) a steel bearing manufacturer (annual sales of $2 billion). All the manufacturing organizations were leaders in their respective industries.
Each organization was offered a report of overall results and customized analyses for its internal purposes. Collectively, these firms contributed 29% (n = 260) of the mail sample.
The federal research laboratory provided the names of 648 points of contact for R&D collaborations conducted over a five-year period. These R&D collaborations were explicitly created to exploit potential technology transfers between the federal laboratories and the commercial sector. In these arrangements, a federal R&D organization worked with a commercial organization, and each party contributed personnel, expertise, and facilities or equipment toward a mutual problem of interest. These collaborations were not procurement transactions-the federal organizations were not allowed to contribute monetary funds; therefore, the agreements were mutual endeavors that required joint effort and cooperation from the two organizations. The collaborations were mutually negotiated, even in the sharing aspects. No specific sharing algorithms or contracts were imposed on the parties in these collaborations. The firms could employ intellectual property created by the collaboration for commercial purposes, whereas the government might retain a license to use the technology advancement for its own purposes as well. Collectively, 908 surveys were mailed to respondents at the five organizations. A total of 299 surveys was returned (a 33% response rate overall).4 Of these, 161 were from commercial organizations and 138 were from federal organizations. The referent collaborations in the sample lasted an average of 2.1 years (SD = 2.8). Respondents came from various areas of R&D: 118 were managers, 66 were scientists, 106 were engineers, and 9 were other staff members. The respondents' knowledge of key aspects of the collaboration was assessed through a battery of specific items at the conclusion of the surveys (see Jap 1999) . Respondents were asked to indicate how knowledgeable they were regarding the intended goals and purpose of the collaboration, each organization's resources to the collaboration, the overall success of the collaboration, and the output of the collaboration. They marked their responses using a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = "hardly knowledgeable," 7 = "very knowledgeable"). The mean response to these items was 6.3 (SD = .82).
Nonresponse bias was examined by a comparison of early (first 75%) with late (last 25%) responses received (Armstrong and Overton 1977). T-tests of all constructs in the conceptual model indicated no significant differences between the early and late responses. In addition, there were no differences across various types of collaboration (Tiers 0-4 from Appendix) or the duration of these collaborations.
Collectively, this suggests that there were no fundamental differences in the responses or nature of the collaboration between early and late respondents.
Collaboration types. I included a categorical measure in the questionnaire to assess the types of R&D collaborations reported by the respondents; the complete measure and associated frequencies are displayed in the Appendix. Respondents were asked to classify their collaboration along the tiers of R&D as described by Hauser (1998) . These tiers describe various types of research endeavors that range from basic research that lays the foundations for additional R&D (Tier 0) to routine engineering for continuous improvement of products and processes (Tier 4). I examined the comprehensibility of this measure extensively in pretest efforts and found no evidence that respondents had any difficulty understanding the descriptions or classifying their work along the tiered structure. More than 70% of the sample described themselves as working on Tiers 2 and 3 of research. Tier 2 research includes directed programs of activities to develop practical competencies that support or fulfill an organization's strategic directions, and Tier 3 research comprises applied projects aimed at specific tasks.
Procedure. Questionnaires were mailed to respondents along with a postage-paid envelope and cover letter from the researcher explaining the purpose of the study. The letter told them that they had been randomly selected from the participating organization's list of collaborative relationships to participate in a university study designed to better understand R&D collaborations. The respondents were guaranteed anonymity of their responses and offered a summary report in exchange for their participation. 4The average response rate froml respondents at the four firms was 62%, whereas the response rate from the federal research laboratory respondents was 21,.
Respondents from the federal research organization were provided the name of a specific collaboration they worked on and were asked to complete all items with respect to that particular collaboration. Respondents from the manufacturing firms were asked to consider a recent collaboration and complete all items with respect to that particular collaboration. They were specifically told that the selected collaboration, "does not have to be a highly successful or complex collaboration, although it may be. I am trying to sample from a variety of relationship types and would like to consider many possibilities." In this way, I was able to ensure that I had the heterogeneity necessary to capture statistical variation among the constructs and increase the representativeness of the relationships studied.
Measurement Estimation
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) techniques are used to estimate a measurement model composed of 11 first-order, latent factors and intercorrelations. These models are estimated using full-information maximum-likelihood (FIML) in LISREL 8.03 (Joreskog and Sorbom 1993) . Each of the 33 observable indicators loaded significantly (a = .001) on its intended factors, which indicates convergent validity among the items of each scale. The item loadings and measurement errors are in acceptable ranges (Bagozzi and Yi 1988) ; these values are listed in the Appendix. Discriminant validity among the scale measures is assessed according to Fornell and Larcker (1981) 
. This involves examination of the amount of variance extracted by each construct (taking measurement error into account) relative to the squared-correlation between pairs of constructs. This is considered a more stringent test of discriminant validity than Campbell's (1959) or Joreskog's (1971) test, because it recognizes the possibility that measurement error can vary in magnitude across items. All possible pairs of factors passed Fornell and Larcker's (1981) test, evidencing discriminant validity among the measures.
The overall chi-square for the model is 786.3 (p < .00) with 440 degrees of freedom (d.f.). Three fit indices-the comparative fit index (CFI), incremental fit index (IFI), and Tucker-Lewis fit index (TLI)-are examined; their values are .94, .94, and .93, respectively. Because high fit indices can also give the false impression that the model explains much when it really is the result of freeing more parameters to be estimated from the data, a useful index to consider is the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). This is a parsimony measure that accounts for potential artificial inflation due to the estimation of many parameters. Values between 0 and .05 indicate a close fit of the model in relation to its degrees of freedom, .05 to .08 indicates a satisfactory fit of the model, and models with values greater than .10 should be rejected (Steiger 1980; Steiger and Lind 1980) . The RMSEA of the measurement model is .051. Therefore, it appears that the scale measures are internally consistent, able to discriminate, and provide a good fit of the factor model to the data.
Higher-orderfactor A second-order factor model of relationship quality is also estimated. This model includes three first-order factors: satisfaction with the collaboration, outcome fairness, and willingness to collaborate in the future. Each of these first-order factors has significant (p < .001) loadings of .96, .90, and .87, respectively, on the secondorder factor. The overall chi-square for this model is 92.6  (p < .00) with 24 d.f. The CFI, IFI, and TLI are .97, .97, and .96, respectively, with an RMSEA of .098.
RESULTS
Tests of Hypotheses
Tests of hypotheses are conducted through the use of hierarchical moderator regression. The model specification includes the main effect and interaction terms of both sharing principles to allow for the possibility of discovering more about the consequences of using an alternative rule. Thus, the following specification is a more complete specification than the specific hypothesized effects:5
(1) Y = oO + lXI + [2X2 + P3X3 + P4XX2 + s5XiX3 + , where Y is relationship quality, X1 is a resource or organizational condition, X2 is an equity sharing principle, X3 is an equality sharing principle, and XiX2 and XIX3 represent the respective interaction of these sharing principles with XI. Although the formal hypotheses focus on the application of sharing principles with specific resources and organizational conditions, I include the main effect of both principles so that I can observe the effects of the alternative principle on relationship quality. In addition, oto is the regression intercept, P1_5 are regression coefficients, and E is the error term for the equation. The data is mean-centered, to reduce potential collinearity with the interaction terms. This model is estimated for two groups: the federal research organization and the commercial organizations. In these analyses, three stepwise hierarchical regressions are conducted. In Step 1, the main effect of resource/organizational condition is entered into the equation. In Step 2, the main effects of the two sharing principles are added to the equation. In Step 3, the interactions are entered into the equation (Cohen and Cohen 1983 ). In Table 2 , the Step 3 regression coefficients are overviewed for both groups. When the interactions are nonsignificant, the Step 2 estimation results using uncentered data are also displayed. This is done because the main effects of the Step 3 regression are changed in the presence of higher-order terms. In the sections to follow, I evaluate the tests of hypotheses and note other significant patterns in the data.
Resource Conditions
When an organization has contributed more resources to a collaboration than its partner, the use of an equity rule has no significant effect on relationship quality for federal (^4 = -.01) or commercial organizations (34 =.01). Thus, there is no support for H1. However, the use of an equality rule when resources are asymmetric has a significant, negative effect on relationship quality (15 = -.10, p < .01) for commercial organizations. The stage 2 main effects estimation for federal organizations suggests that asymmetric resources have a significant, negative effect (11 = -.22, p < .01) on relationship quality. Equality sharing has a significant, positive effect (33 = .28, p < .01), but the effect of equity sharing is not significant (12 = .12).
When the resources to the collaboration are separable and an equity rule is used, there is a nonsignificant effect on relationship quality for federal (34 = -.00) and commercial (P4 = -.07) organizations. Thus, H2 is not supported. Stage 2 estimation for federal organizations indicates that resource separability and equality sharing have significant, positive effects (11 = .30, p < .01 and 13 = .31, p < .01, respectively) on relationship quality, but the effect of equity sharing is not significant (12 = .11). However, the effects of resource separability  (Pi = .23, p < .01), equity sharing (12 = .20, p < .01), and  equality sharing (33 = .14, p < .03) 
Organizational Conditions
If an organization can observe the partner and an equity rule is used, this has a significant, positive effect on relationship quality for federal organizations (14 = .07, p < .05), but the effect is not significant for commercial organizations (14 = -.04). Therefore, H4 is supported for federal organizations but not for commercial organizations. For federal organizations, the ability to observe the other party and equality sharing have a significant, negative effect on relationship quality (15 = -.08, p < .05). Stage 2 estimation results for commercial organizations indicate significant, positive effects on relationship quality for the following factors: the ability to monitor the other party (P1 = .18, p < .01), equity sharing (P2 = .22, p < .01), and equality sharing (13 = .15,p< .02).
If an organization understands its partner's transformation process and uses an equity rule, there is a significant, negative effect on relationship quality for the federal (14 = -.19, p < .01) and commercial (34 = -.12, p < .05) organizations. Therefore, there is no support for H5. However, when a federal organization understands its partner's transformation process and shares equally, there is a significant, positive effect (15 = .18, p < .01) on relationship quality. When both parties value the payoffs of the collaboration similarly and an equality rule is used, there is a significant, negative effect on relationship quality for federal organizations (A5 = -. 10, p < .05) but a significant, positive effect for commercial organizations (A5 = .09, p < .05). Therefore, H6 is supported for commercial organizations. When the parties value the payoffs similarly and an equity rule is used, the opposite pattern of results occurs. There is a significant, positive effect on relationship quality for federal organizations (54 = .10, p < .05) and a significant, negative effect on relationship quality for commercial organizations (14 = -.12, p< .01). 
DISCUSSION
To date, there has been little systematic attention given to the sharing process as an interorganizational phenomenon. Research in marketing has examined the issue peripherally in other contexts, but there has never been an explicit focus on the process or its impact on the relationship. For example, research on channel coordination mentions the use of an equality rule (Jeuland and Shugan 1983) and an equity rule (Stern, El-Ansary, and Coughlan 1996) in aligning the parties' incentives and fostering desirable coordination behav-iors. Research on bargaining behavior examines the payoffs to individual parties; however, the emphasis of this stream of work is on how bargaining processes determine the terms of exchange or enable the parties to manage power asymmetries (Dwyer 1984; Dwyer and Walker 1981; Walker 1971) .
The results of this research indicate that the ability to separate each organization's input to a collaboration and the joint creation of idiosyncratic input improves relationship quality, in general. I also find that the use of more complex sharing principles, such as the equity principle, when the parties have an understanding of each other's transformation process, has a negative impact on relationship quality. This suggests that the use of an equity principle when an organization can map a reasonable expectation of the payoff ex ante may be excessive.
Spinning Technology In and Out
Along with these general effects, several results differed systematically for federal and commercial organizations. Subsequent interviews with the organizations revealed an explanation for these differences. Apparently, a major goal of many federal research collaborations with industry is to "spin" technology out to the private sector, with the expectation that the private sector will apply the technology in material and product development efforts. These materials and products provide better value to society and will subsequently be procured back into the government sector. In contrast, the goal of commercial organizations is to bring technology into the firm. For them, return on investments, share of benefits, and process efficiency are critical. These seemingly opposite orientations help explain differences in results.
In particular, these differences underscore the need for the sharing process to be responsive to the goals of the collaboration. For example, when the collaboration process is meant to spin technology into the organizations (e.g., commercial firms), the sharing strategy should reduce the likelihood of opportunism, ensure a fair return on investments, and facilitate efficient processes. Specifically, being able to observe the other firm's activities improves relationship quality. However, using an equality principle when the firm's input is greater than the counterpart's input has a negative effect on relationship quality, because it does not ensure a fair share. Moreover, the use of an equity principle when idiosyncratic investments exist or the firms value the payoffs of the collaboration similarly also has a negative impact on the relationship, because the principle may be cumbersome to implement. Instead, it is better to use an equality principle when the firms value the payoffs similarly.
When the collaboration process is meant to spin technology out of the organization (e.g., federal laboratories), the sharing process reflects less concern with resource input (although a large asymmetry is not good) and more concern with successful transfer of the technology. Specifically, an equality-sharing principle is generally good, particularly when the organization understands the counterpart's transformation process ex ante. Some exceptions to this are if the counterpart's behavior is observable or it has similar payoff values. Under these conditions, an equity principle is better for relationship quality. It may be that a more complex sharing principle under these conditions helps ensure a better transfer process in the collaboration.
In summary, the results highlight the sharing process as a strategic, interorganizational process for complex collaboration contexts. The careful application of equity-and equality-sharing principles applied judiciously to specific types of complex collaborations can improve the participants' satisfaction with the collaboration, their perceptions of the fairness of the outcomes, and their willingness to collaborate again in the future.
Limitations
There are a few limitations to consider. First, because all the commercial organizations were market leaders, the generalizability of the results may be limited. Second, the survey methodology may have created common method variance that could have inflated construct relationships. This could be particularly threatening if the survey respondents were providing responses that they believed were socially acceptable-that is, positive relationship outcomes and a high degree of sharing. However, the respondents were not told that sharing was the specific issue of interest in this study, nor did anyone in the pretest efforts guess that this was the real purpose of the study. Respondents were merely told that the purpose of the study was to understand how better to manage R&D collaborations between organizations. In addition, the items for all the constructs were separated and mixed with items of other constructs so that no one respondent would be able to detect which items were affecting which factors. Therefore, the biasing possibilities of common method variance were minimized to some degree.
There are many other factors that could affect the use of sharing rules and the type of rules that are used in noisy collaboration environments. There is also a level of detail in the process that my measurements are not able to capture and reflect.
Future Research Directions
There remain many aspects of interorganizational sharing that are yet to be understood. For example, one aspect that was not explicitly investigated in this research is the effect of the external environment on sharing strategies. In particular, one interesting aspect to consider would be the interaction of a technology life cycle and the nature of sharing in interorganizational collaborations. Cainarca, Colombo, and Mariotti (1992) have examined how types of agreements in equity ventures should vary appropriately at various stages of a technology life cycle. It may be that sharing strategies also vary systematically over the life cycle.
Further research might also investigate the impact of these rules on interorganizational behavior and processes. It may be that the choice of a sharing rule affects how organizations work together; for example, does the use of an equality rule cause the parties to be less productive in their individual efforts? Such possibilities are worth investigating.
In this study, I have tried to examine the impact of sharing in close collaborations and discover the process by which this occurs in complex contexts. My results indicate that the sharing process can significantly affect overall relationship quality in a positive or negative way, depending on how sharing principles are applied in conjunction with various resource and organizational conditions and depending on the goals of the collaboration. By observing the rules and conditions under which the rules are used, I can infer something about the information environment in which these rules exist. I also hope to stimulate thinking on how to design the rules better.
ITEMS, RELIABILITIES, LOADINGS, AND MEASUREMENT ERRORS
Measurement Asymmetric Resources (a = .87) Loading Error
Our organization has made greater contributions to complete the task than the other party. .83 .31 Our resources to the R&D effort were greater than the other organization's resources.
.85 .27 We have contributed more resources to this effort than the other party.
.79 .37
Separable Resources (a = .64) It is difficult to trace each party's contributions to the task. (reverse coded) .48 .77 Each party's resources into the task are easily separated.
.71 .49 Each party's contributions to the task are distinct.
.66 .56
Idiosyncratic Resources (a = .76) Both organizations have made investments that would be lost if the relationship were prematurely terminated. .78 .39 If the collaboration were to end, both organizations would waste a lot of knowledge that's tailored to their relationship.
.76 .42 Both organizations have made investments that are unique to this relationship.
.54 .71 If either organization were to switch to another partner, they would lose a lot of the investments made in the present relationship. .
.66
Ability to Observe the Other Party's Actions (a = .88)
We can easily observe their actions. .95 .10 It is easy for us to observe their efforts.
.92 .16 It is difficult for us to observe their activities. (reverse coded)
.68 .54
Understanding of the Transformation Process (a = .78)
We know the processes and actions that the other party must do in this task. .66 .56 We understand well what the role of the other organization is in completing this task.
.82 .32 We can comprehend what the other party must do to accomplish their share of the task.
.73 .47
Equal Payoff Valuation
Both parties value the payoffs of this relationship similarly. .82 .32 The benefits of this collaboration are equally valued by both organizations.
.82 .33
Equity Sharing (oa = .77) An organization's resources to the collaboration determine its share of the output of working together. .69 .52 Each organization's share of the benefits of this collaboration depends on its contributions to the task.
.76 .42 Each organization's share of the outcomes depends on what it provides to support the joint effort.
.72 .48
Equality Sharing (a = .78)
The organizations share the outcomes of the collaboration equally between them. .56 .68 Each party receives half of all benefits from the collaboration.
.76 .42 The gains from the joint effort are equally shared between the organizations.
.90 .19
Outcome Fairness (a = .86) Our outcomes received from this collaboration are just. .75 .43 The benefits of collaboration with them have been fair.
.82 .33 Our gains from this collaboration have been fair.
.85 .27
Satisfaction with the Collaboration (a = .90)
Our collaboration with them has been a successful one. .87 .24 Our collaboration with them has more than fulfilled our expectations.
.82 .33 We are satisfied with the outcomes from this collaboration.
.93 .14
Willingness to Collaborate in the Future (a = .94)
We would welcome the possibility of additional collaboration in the future. We would be willing to work with them again in the future. We would be willing to collaborate with them again, should the opportunity arise.
.88 .94 .94
.22 .11 .12
